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Accuracy in Journalism:
An Economic Approach
James C. Cox and Alvin I. Goldman

TH E CONCEPTION O F SOC IA L EPISTEM OLOGY
This chapter is part of a larger project to define and develop a certain
nontraditional sector of epistemology— a sector dubbed "social
epistemology." As traditionally pursued by philosophers, epistemology
is the attempt to study, analyze, or guide the efforts of isolated cognizers,
each of whom has the task of deciding, without fundamental dependence
on others, what to believe about the world. The individualistic tradition
in epistemology received its initial impetus from Descartes, who
identified self-knowledge as the starting point of all knowledge. But even
epistemologists who reject Descartes’s starting point have typically agreed
with Descartes in viewing epistemology as the theory of isolated,
independent cognizers, each pursuing truth on the basis of evidence
available to him or her as an individual. This individualistic conception
does not wholly exclude other cognitive agents. The target agent can
legitimately consider evidence gleaned from the utterances or speech acts
of other people. Nonetheless, the perspective of traditional epistemology
is emphatically individualistic: it studies almost exclusively the sorts of
reasoning procedures available to the individual agent, with the aim of
selecting the best of these procedures.
How might social epistemology differ from traditional, individual
epistemology? One of the present authors (Goldman 1987b, also see
1986, 1987a, 1991a, 1994) has proposed the following conception of
social epistemology. In addition to the reasoning and other psychological
processes that influence agents in deciding what to believe, there are
189
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various group processes and institutional arrangements that also influence
belief formation. The proper domain of social epistemology, then, is the
social processes and institutional provisions that standardly affect belief
formation. Furthermore, just as it is widely held that individual
epistemology should evaluate candidate reasoning procedures in terms of
their tendency to lead reasoners to true rather than false beliefs, similarly
social epistemology should evaluate various social processes and
institutional arrangements in terms of their promotion of true rather than
false beliefs. With the possible exception of pure science, there may not
be any existing social processes or practices that are exclusively dedicated
to the pursuit of truth, independent of other types of social values. But
whatever the relative importance of true belief as compared with other
kinds of social values, and whatever weight is placed on true belief by
our current institutions, the distinctive role of social epistemology (as
contrasted with social theory generally) is the assessment of the truthconducive properties of sundry social practices. The pursuit of truth is
not the be-all or end-all of social life, but it is the special proprietary
interest of social epistemology.
SOM E EXAM PLES
Some simple examples of social epistemology may help put some flesh
on this rather abstract skeleton. As a first example, consider true or false
judgments that are the product of group decision-making. For instance,
committees can judge (or try to judge) what is the most efficient plan for
achieving a specified institutional end. Or they can judge which of
various candidates would turn in the best performance on a specified job,
or in a certain course of study (e.g., a doctoral program). In some of
these cases it may be problematic whether judgments have definite truth
values. So consider a case where this is relatively unproblematic:
weather prediction. A prediction today that it will ran in Tucson
tomorrow has a definite truth value, although its truth will not be known
with certainty until tomorrow. We ignore here borderline cases such as
mist, and also the problem of whether there is a truth value today about
tomorrow’s weather. At least we can say, once tomorrow has gone, that
today’s prediction of rain either came out true or came out false.
Admittedly, many weather predictions nowadays are made with
probabilistic qualifiers, e.g., "There is a 20 percent chance of rain
tomorrow." It is problematic whether such predictions can turn out either
true or false.
Assume, then, that weather predictions are made
categorically, e.g., "It will rain tomorrow," or, "The high tomorrow will
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be in the mid-80s [i.e., between 83 and 87])." Such predictions certainly
qualify as true or false. Now, most weather forecasting is done by single
weather forecasters. But consider a television station that assembles a
team of weather experts and assigns them the task of collectively
producing a local weather forecast. Supposing that they have different
degrees of competence or expertise, ascertainable by looking at their
individual past track records, how should the opinions of these several
experts be pooled or weighted to arrive at the most accurate group
judgment? This is one sort of problem in social epistemology.
This problem, in fact, is quite tractable. As Shapley and Grofman
(1984) show, if individual judgments are mutually independent, and if
each of the two choices (in our case, rain or nonrain) is a priori equally
likely, then the best way to maximize the probability of the team’s
making an accurate prediction is to assign certain weights to each expert
as a function of his or her individual competence. In other words, the
most truth-conducive scheme is not majority rule with equal weights, nor
dictatorial rule by the most competent expert (if a single forecaster has
the highest competence), but a rule that assigns weights Wj in proportion
to log(Pi/(l - p^), where pj represents the probability that member i
individually makes a true prediction. Suppose, for example, that there is
a five-member team whose individual probabilities of correctness are: .9,
.9, .6, .6, and .6, respectively. Then one way of assigning weights in
conformity with this rule is: .392, .392, .072, .072, and .072. Assigning
these weights and determining a group judgment by weighted voting
would then generate a group competence (expected truthfulness) of .927.
This is higher than the individual competence of any single member who
might be chosen as dictator, but also higher than unweighted majority
rule, which has a group probability of only .877. Thus, adoption of this
sort of group judgmental practice might be a recommendation of social
epistemology. (Its preferability, however, depends on the feasibility of
determining accurately the individual competences of all members.)
A second set of examples will be drawn from judicial practices. Juries
are prime examples of committees assigned the task of arriving at a group
judgment, and presumably a principal desideratum of jury judgments is
accuracy, e.g., judging an accused man to be guilty if and only if he is
truly (genuinely) guilty of the charge(s) in question. Accuracy or truth
is not the only desideratum of trial proceedings, but it is an important one
and the one that interests social epistemology. Now, there are many
institutional aspects of trial proceedings that seem to be dedicated, at least
in part, to obtaining accurate verdicts. Among these are evidenciary rules
governing the admission or exclusion of evidence. The rationale for these
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rules is stated in Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
explicitly mentions the goal of truth: "These rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined" (emphasis added). One of the evidenciary rules, Rule 403,
states in part: "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury." If this rule is indeed rationalized by
reference to the aim of truth (see Goldman 1991a), then it is appropriate
for social epistemology to inquire whether such a rule actually promotes
accuracy just as well as competing rules that might be substituted in its
place. This is an example of how social epistemology is concerned with
institutional provisions that bear on truth acquisition. Other such
examples in the law might include rules for jury selection, the privileged
attorney-client relationship and advocacy responsibilities, and so forth.
A third example of the domain of social epistemology concerns the
topic of argumentation. Goldman (1994) defends the view that social
argumentation is governed by tacit rules that are dedicated to the goal of
advancing true belief, either for the arguers themselves or for their
audience. Part of social epistemology is the elucidation of these rules and
the examination of them to see whether they are indeed truth conducive.
Assuming that they are so conducive, another recommended task for
social epistemology is to explore the variables that influence the extent
and quality of argumentation, i.e., the frequency or infrequency with
which serious disputation takes place in formal or informal contexts, and
the quality of such argumentation, i.e., the degree to which the rules of
good argumentation are actually instantiated.
This last task is one to which social scientific models, e.g., rational
choice models, can make an important contribution. An example of this
is the work of Michael MacKuen (1990), who provides a game-theoretic
analysis of decisions to engage in face-to-face political argumentation.
The paradigmatic situation MacKuen examines is that of a citizen
encountering an acquaintance in an elevator during an election campaign.
Will our first citizen initiate a political conversation, or will he be
deterred by recalling that the last time he made a political comment his
interlocutor called his ideas "foolish" and smugly wandered down the
hall? The incidence and extent of political interaction—especially
argumentation with people of differing opinions—is widely regarded as
significant for democracy. But MacKuen’s analysis suggests that the
strategy of CLAMMING (avoiding political argumentation) is much more
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likely to be chosen than TALKING (arguing), so MacKuen is highly
pessimistic about the prospects of cross-factional political debate. To the
extent that cross-factional argumentation is helpful for truth acquisition,
a low incidence of such argumentation is (or would be) a matter of
concern to social epistemology. And the variables that influence this
incidence should also be of concern to social epistemology, from both a
theoretical and a policy perspective.
JOU RN ALISM AND SOC IA L EPISTEM OLOGY
In this chapter we focus on journalism as a special target of social
epistemological study. Traditional epistemology would most naturally
address journalism solely from the vantage point of the reader: what
inferences can or should a reader make from stories in a newspaper? Our
perspective will be somewhat different. We shall ask about the variables
that affect the truthfulness or accuracy of stories that get printed in
newspapers (or presented on television). We recognize, of course, that
readers need not believe everything they read or see, but we shall assume
that the default procedure, at least, is to believe what one reads (or sees).
Hence, people will suffer from erroneous belief, or misinformation, if
newspapers in fact present falsehoods (or half-truths). What are the
factors, then, that influence the truth value of what is printed in
newspapers?
Some other preliminary comments are in order. It goes without saying
that newspapers print much that does not fall in the category of "news,"
and that what motivates readers is not exclusively an interest in truth.
Readers often read for entertainment, where the "facts" are immaterial.
For purposes of present discussion, however, we restrict attention to
news, and to truth-related interests. We do not deny the existence of non
cognitive interests, but we also believe that readers are substantially and
sincerely interested in truth. They expect the sports pages to report
correctly the outcomes of games, and to provide accurate statistics. They
want coverage of crime in their neighborhood to be accurate, and they
expect announcements of the times and locations of movies and cultural
events to reflect the facts. They would be quite unhappy with faulty
stock market reports, and similarly for other news of business
developments. Even when it comes to official corruption or the sexual
escapades of political figures, they are not interested in sheer fantasy.
Though they may prefer titillating stories to less colorful items, they
would not be (so) interested if the stories were known to be spun out of
whole cloth. There may be some kinds of things that readers prefer not

194

JAMES C. COX AND ALVIN I. GOLDMAN

to know about, but they read newspapers in large part with the hope of
learning selected facts. Notice that our claim of a substantial interest in
truth is not essential to social epistemology. Social epistemology could
conduct an inquiry into the factors affecting the accuracy or objectivity
of journalism even if readers themselves had little or no concern for truth.
But in this chapter we shall assume that truth acquisition is a major goal
of readers.
Admittedly, the concepts of truthfulness and objectivity, especially
concerning the news, are concepts very much in dispute. Although it
would be impossible to allay all relevant worries about these concepts,
some remarks may help defuse some of these worries. At a minimum we
can identify where we stand (or at least where the philosopher-author,
A.G., stands) on these issues. One set of worries about the concept of
truth is abstractly philosophical. Is the concept of truth to be defined or
understood independently of the possibility of human verification, or does
it depend essentially on verificational possibilities? We take a "realist"
position on this issue. The concept of truth allows for the possibility of
certain propositions being true— in other terminology, of there being
certain "facts"—even if these facts are in principle unknowable or
unverifiable by human beings. For example, there may be facts beyond
our ken because they concern matters at some distant comer of the
universe, spatio-temporally too far removed from human detection during
the whole of humankind’s sojourn at this comer of the universe. In
addition to distinguishing truth from the possibility of human detection,
it is particularly important to distinguish truth from actual human
detection. There are presumably many truths that are unknown to any
human beings. These may include, for example, what particular kinds of
fish, if any, are swimming at a particular spot in the ocean depths at a
particular time. Such a fact may indeed be unknown to any human, but
that doesn’t mean that it isn’t a truth. It is important to separate the
concept of truth from the concept of knowledge because the
acknowledged difficulties in settling when people have knowledge should
not be allowed to undermine the concept of truth itself. When people
disagree, and when evidence conflicts, it is difficult to tell, or know,
where the truth lies. But that does not imply that there is no truth of the
matter, however uncertain, or subject to dispute it may be. Of course, not
every factual-looking sentence may be the kind of sentence that has a
truth value (i.e., truth or falsity). Sentences concerning morals and
normative politics are prime examples of sentences often said to lack a
truth value. We take no stand on this issue. What we do assume is that
many of the matters reported in news stories do have truth values, and it
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is their truth values that we shall be addressing. The full range of truthvaluable sentences need not be settled here.
In point of fact, we are not just interested in the truth values of the
sentences actually printed in news stories (or reported on television or
radio). Even if all such sentences are true, they may be (seriously)
misleading in the sense that they lead large segments of the readership or
audience to infer other statements that are false. To take a simple
example, a news story may report: "Yesterday official O asserted p." If
O is a highly credible source for most of the readership, they will infer
not only that O asserted p but that p is true. Suppose, however, that p is
false. Since the story docs not assert p, it does not literally contain
anything false. But it does promote a false belief in (much of) its
readership, and in that sense is misleading. (In the sense used here,
obviously, misleadingness need not be deliberate.)
Similarly, an
incomplete and/or slanted news story may distort the facts not in the
sense that it says literally false things but in the sense that it leads readers
to draw further conclusions that are false. The accuracy of journalism
should be measured not simply by the truth of the sentences it prints, but
by the degree of its misleadingness or nonmislcadingness.
Many, perhaps most, academic treatments of journalism take a very
skeptical or cynical view of the media’s capacity or disposition to depict
reality accurately. This is clearly reflected in numerous book titles
dealing with the news, e.g., The News: The Politics o f Illusion (Bennett
1983), Making News: A Study in the Construction o f Reality (Tuchman
1978), Inventing Reality: The Politics o f the Mass Media (Parcnti 1985),
and The Manufacture o f News (Cohen and Young 1981). A pervasive
theme in media analysis is that the media arc engaged in "constructing"
reality, which strongly intimates that they cannot be "reporting the truth."
It is essential, however, to distinguish two senses of reality
"construction.” In one sense, constructing reality might consist in literal
fabrication or invention of news, i.e., the reportage of items that never
occurred, or never occurred in the manner described. This sense of
construction or fabrication straightforwardly implies falsity. A second
sense of "reality construction," however, merely refers to the selection or
choice of events to report from a vast flux of daily occurrences. It refers
partly to the fact that media managers have categories they regard as
important, newsworthy, or appealing to their audience, and they choose
events and design media presentations in conformity with these categories
and criteria. This second sense of reality construction, however, does not
straightforwardly imply falsity. The selection of bits of reality from a
welter of alternatives does not necessarily involve untruths or distortion,
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unless such selection is misleading in the sense specified earlier. So even
if we grant that media managers "construct" reality in the second sense,
we need not necessarily despair of truthfulness in the news.
Let us now tum to some of the practices and institutional structures in
journalism that invite treatment from social epistemology. It may help
to introduce some of this material with the help of an infamous
journalistic incident.
Jimmy is 8 years old and a third-generation heroin addict, a precocious
little boy with sandy hair, velvety brown eyes and needle marks freckling
the baby-smooth skin of his thin brown arms. .. . His hands are clasped
behind his head, fancy running shoes adorn his feet and a striped Izod T
shirt hangs over his thin frame. "Bad, ain’t it," he boasts to a reporter
visiting recently. "I got me six of these.”
So began an article by Janet Cooke on the front page of The
Washington Post on Sunday, September 28, 1980. (See Goldstein 1985,
pp. 215 ff., for details.) The reporter Cooke was promoted from a
weekly suburban section to the far more prestigious metropolitan section.
Washington Mayor Marion Barry, Jr., ordered police and social service
agencies to find the boy. When police threatened to subpoena Cooke in
an effort to force her to reveal the names and addresses of her sources,
the Post supported her in resisting the issuance of the subpoena. Red
flags were subsequently hoisted within the Post itself, as Cooke seemed
to be unacquainted with the neighborhood where Jimmy was supposed to
live. Nonetheless, the editors submitted the story for the Pulitzer Prize,
which it won the following April. Unfortunately, things started to
unravel soon thereafter. It turned out that Cooke had falsified her
credentials on her resumé. She said she was an honors graduate of
Vassar, in fact, she had dropped out after a year and finished up college
at the University of Toledo. After Cooke confessed about this lie, she
was interrogated by Post editors for several hours and finally admitted
that she had fabricated the Jimmy story as well as her resumé. In a
survey done three years after the Janet Cooke scandal, the ethics
committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors found it had
become a general rule among newspapers that a reporter must share with
an editor the identity of a confidential source.
This story conveniently introduces four principal types of agents or
actors that are relevant in the analysis of journalism: (1) readers, (2)
reporters, (3) editors, and (4) sources. Readers read stories in newspapers
to acquire new knowledge or information, i.e., new truths. Their success
in this endeavor, however, depends on the stories’ they read being true.
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However, one of the principal actors in the construction of such stories,
viz. reporters, have some incentives for fabrication. Obviously, not all
stories are of equal interest to the readership, nor of equal interest,
therefore, to editors. Stories that are highly "newsworthy" (whatever
exactly that amounts to) are of greater interest to the readership, and are
therefore of greater value to reporters, since their production can lead to
promotions, higher pay, and even Pulitzer Prizes. Editors also have an
interest in publishing highly "newsworthy" stories, but they can also
suffer if their newspaper earns a reputation for fabrication or
exaggeration. Thus, they have a professional interest in ensuring the
accuracy of their reporters’ stories.
The fourth type of actor, the source, is purely imaginary in the Janet
Cooke incident. But most stories (especially those involving politics)
typically involve a source or informant as the reporter’s basis of the story.
Here too we have two actors with frequently divergent interests. The
source may want the public or some other actors on the political scene to
believe certain things which in fact are untrue, or only a partial truth.
Thus, what he or she tells a reporter has a certain probability of being
(wholly or partially) false. In other language, the source may wish to get
out a story with a certain "spin" that is favorable to his or her political
interests. The reporter, on the other hand, does not wish to publish a
story (under his or her byline) that will subsequently be revealed as
erroneous or misleading. Yet the reporter may need to cooperate with the
source, at least to some extent, if he or she is going to continue to receive
stories from that source. Some sources are extremely valuable to a
reporter by virtue of their position and "inside" knowledge. Thereby arise
some noncoinciding interests between sources and reporters, which affect
what sources tell reporters and what stories reporters subsequently write.
AN ECO N OM IC A PPROACH TO INFORM ATION
A SYM M ETRIES IN JOURNALISM
Much of modem economic theory is concerned with developing
models that include information asymmetries. The appeal of this type of
model is obvious: it will often be the case that some important kinds of
information are inherently private, not public information.
Some
illustrative examples would be these: the quality of a used car may be
known by the prospective seller but not known by the prospective buyer;
the productivity of a prospective new employee may be known by the
worker but not known by the employer; the risk attitude of one’s
opponent in a game of strategy may be known by the opponent but not
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known by oneself; and the limit price of the other party in a wage or
price bargaining game may be known by the other party but not known
by oneself. It seems natural to explore the possibility that adaptations
and/or extensions of economic models of information asymmetries might
be applicable to some questions that arise in studying journalism. The
present chapter begins that exploration.
There appear to be various information asymmetries in journalism.
One type of information asymmetry would seem to be a necessary
condition for the very existence of journalism: if journalists cannot
credibly claim to know some things that are not common knowledge, then
they have nothing to sell. We shall explain that other, more subtle
information asymmetries can be important determinants of the
truthfulness or accuracy of stories that get reported by journalists.
Two simple models arc developed in the next two sections of the
chapter. One model analyzes the role that editors might play in
establishing accuracy standards in journalism. This model focuses on the
implications of readers’ not being able to know individual reporters by
their reputations for accuracy. In that case, what are the implications of
there being low-accuracy and high-accuracy reporters in journalism? Will
there be a pooling equilibrium in which readers do not know whether
they are buying low- or high-accuracy stories? Or will there be a
Gresham’s Law for journalism in which low-accuracy reporters drive
high-accuracy reporters out of the business, with the result that readers
are only able to buy low-accuracy stories? Or will there be a separating
equilibrium in which low-accuracy and high-accuracy reporters self-select
into a two-tier journalistic market in which readers can knowingly choose
to buy low-accuracy or high-accuracy stories? What role might editors
play in this reporter self-selection process? As we shall see in the next
section, the answer is that editors can establish editorial standards that
make a separating equilibrium feasible.
The second model is concerned with the relationship between sources
and reporters. It focuses on the case of a single source and a single
reporter. A question of central interest in studying truthfulness in
reporting is identifying conditions under which the source can control
how the reporter writes the story after the source gives his or her
information to the reporter. If the source has no ability to reward or
punish the reporter, then the source has no control. Suppose, instead, that
the source can reward or punish the reporter by, say, granting or
withholding future favors. Then, if the source can observe the reporter’s
choice of action, the outcome is transparent. If the source can offer the
reporter sufficient reward, and prefers to do so, then the source can
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control how the reporter chooses to write the story. This case is
analytically trivial. The interesting case is one in which the source
cannot observe the reporter’s choice of action. Suppose that the source
can read the story and leam whether it is relatively favorable or
unfavorable to his or her interests, but that the source cannot know
whether the favorable or unfavorable content resulted from the reporter’s
choices or from decisions made by the editor, the publisher, or some
other actor. Under what conditions would the source be able to control
the reporter’s action even without observing it? The answer, provided by
the model developed in the section on sources and reporters, involves a
concept from statistics known as the "monotone likelihood ratio
property." As we shall see, if the likelihood that the reporter chose an
action favorable to the source’s interests is a monotone-increasing
function of the source’s utility payoff from the story, then there exists a
system of rewards that would make it possible for the source to control
the reporter’s choice of action even without observing that choice. This
outcome can be problematic for accuracy in journalism because it makes
a reporter’s choice between more truthful and less truthful reporting
subject to control by the source.
EDITORS AND REPO RTERS1
Assume, for simplicity, that there are two types of reporters. One type
of reporter produces high-accuracy stories, each of which has value vh to
readers. The other type of reporter produces low-accuracy stories, each
of which has value Vi to readers. We assume that low-accuracy stories
have positive value and that high-accuracy stories have higher value: vh
> Vj > 0.
Assume that there are so many reporters that readers cannot know
them individually by reputation. In that case, a reader cannot know at the
time of purchase whether an individual story has high or low accuracy.
Let Tt,, be the proportion of high-accuracy reporters in the population of
reporters. Also assume, for simplicity, that all reporters write the same
number of stories; hence 7th is also the proportion of high-accuracy stories
in the population of stories so long as high-accuracy reporters remain
active.
If both high- and low-accuracy reporters are active, then the expected
value of a story is
(1)

V=7ChVh + ( l - 7th) v , .
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Thus, so long as readers cannot know the reputations for accuracy of
individual reporters, the most that they will be willing to pay for an
individual story is v (unless they are risk preferring). If stories sell for
V, then the high-accuracy reporters will be paid less than the value of
their stories and the low-accuracy reporters will be paid more than the
value of their stories. Furthermore, no reader can ever be assured in
advance that a particular story has high accuracy. Finally, this outcome
is the best of the possible outcomes for the present case because it is
based on the assumption that high-accuracy reporters are willing to sell
stories that are worth vh for a price of (at most) v < vh. However, if
high-accuracy reporters can earn v0 in their best alternative employment,
and if V < v0, then high-accuracy reporters will exit. In that case, all
available stories will be low-accuracy ones with value v, < v.
We now introduce a third type of agent, known as an "editor." We
assume that there are few enough editors so that readers can know
individual editors by their reputations. Reporters can work with editors
that impose various editorial standards. The function of editors is to
certify to readers the editorial standard for accuracy, e, that is met by
stories written by their reporters. We assume that editors cannot check
every (alleged) fact in every story for accuracy, but that they can check
on the procedures followed by their reporters and certify that the
procedures arc appropriate for an editorial standard e.
Let c, be the constant marginal effort cost per story to a low-accuracy
reporter of meeting editorial standard e, where e > 0, Similarly, let c,, be
the marginal effort cost per story to a high-accuracy reporter of meeting
editorial standard e. Assume that it requires more effort for a lowaccuracy reporter to meet any editorial standard than it does for a highaccuracy reporter to meet the same standard; i.e., assume that
(2)

c, > Ch > 0, for all e > 0.

Finally, let 0 be the amount that an editor deducts from the value of a
story before paying a wage to a reporter, that is, 0 is the compensation
of editors for their services.
We will identify conditions under which there exists a separating
equilibrium. Let a > 0, and consider the following wage scale for
reporters:

(3)

w(e) = a

vk - 0 for e > e*
v, - 0 for 0 < e < e*
v,
for e = 0.
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Under this wage scale, any reporter who works with an editor that
certifies an editorial standard of e* or higher will be paid a wage that is
proportional to the value of a high-accuracy story less the editor’s
compensation. The proportionality factor, a , is the average number of
stories per unit of time that a reporter writes. Similarly, reporters who
work with editors that certify positive editorial standards below e* will
be paid a wage that is proportional to the value of a low-accuracy story
less the editor’s compensation. Finally, reporters who do not work with
editors will be paid a wage that is proportional to the value of a lowaccuracy story.
Next, assume that
(4)

0 < 0 < vh - v ,,

and recall that vh > v, . Let e* be some positive real number such
that

> e* >

(5)

y. - e
c.

We know that such an e* exists because c, > ch > 0 and vh - v, - 0 > 0.
We will show that statements (3)-(5) imply the following equilibrium
editorial standards for low- and high-accuracy reporters:
(6)

e, = 0; eh = e*.

There exists a separating equilibrium if each type of reporter prefers its
own wage and editorial standard to the wage and editorial standard
preferred by the other type of reporter. But this follows immediately
from statements (3)-(6) because

e* >
(7)

v, -e ->c, e . >vh
c.

->v, > vh -0 - c, e*
—>w(0) - occ,0 > w(e*) - ac, e*

and

v, - 0
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V„ - V, - 0

> e* ->vh - V, - 8 > che*

( 8)

->vh - 0 - che* > V,
-> w(e*) - aqe* > w(0) - ach 0.

Therefore, reporters can self-select in the following way. High-accuracy
reporters can choose to work for newspapers that impose editorial
standard e*; these reporters will be paid a wage of w(e*) = a(v h - 0).
Low-accuracy reporters can choose editorial standard 0; these reporters
will be paid a wage of w(0) = a v , .
Under what conditions can such a separating equilibrium be attained?
It is necessary that each type of reporter prefers its own wage and
editorial standard to the one preferred by the other type of reporter.
Statements (7) and (8) show that these necessary conditions are satisfied
by the wage scale (3) and the editorial standards e, = 0 and eh = e* if
statement (4) is satisfied. Statement (4) places an upper limit on the
compensation, 0, that is paid to editors: 0 < vh - v , ; i.e., an editor cannot
be paid more per story than the difference in value between high- and
low-accuracy stories. Two other necessary conditions are as follows:

(9)

JL w(e*) - c^e* = vh - 0 - c,,e* è v; and

(10)

1 w(e*) - c,,e* = vh - 0 - c^e* > v0.
a

a

Condition (9) is necessary because, if it is not satisfied, then highaccuracy reporters prefer not to work with editors and, instead, sell their
stories at the average story-accuracy price, V. Condition (10) is necessary
because, if it is not satisfied, then high-accuracy reporters prefer not to
work with editors and, instead, exit from reporting. Both (9) and (10)
place restrictions on the amount of compensation, 0, that can be received
by editors.
The separating equilibrium in editorial standards realizes the consumer
and producer surplus from transactions in high-accuracy stories; however,
it produces less social surplus than would be attainable if readers could
know individual reporters by their reputations for high or low accuracy.
The reason for this is that editors must be paid part of the value of high-
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accuracy stories even though they neither write stories nor add to the
quality of high-accuracy stories. The only role that editors play is in
establishing editorial standards that make it feasible for high- and lowaccuracy reporters to self-select into a two-tier journalistic market.
SOURCES AND REPORTERS
We have noted above that a reporter may not always be interested in
truthful reporting because a story that contains some false information or
some half-truths may be more newsworthy than a factually more accurate
story. We have also noted that reporters may differ in their individual
capacities for accuracy. These questions will not be discussed in this
section. In order to focus on analyzing conditions under which sources
can control how stories are reported, we will here assume that reporters
are only interested in truthful reporting.
Reporting of political news is often dependent on information provided
by sources with insider information. Such sources arc often not simply
interested in making information public but, instead, have an interest in
having the information that they provide reported in ways that promote
the source’s objectives. Such reporting may or may not be truthful.
Analysis of the relationship between sources and reporters is trivial in the
case where both types of agents want all valid information to be
accurately reported. In contrast, the case where reporters arc interested
in truthful reporting, but sources are interested in having readers misled
in certain ways, is an interesting one to analyze. Our analysis will focus
on the basic question of identifying conditions under which it is possible
for a source to control how the reporter uses the information provided by
the source.
There are many aspects to the informal contractual relationship
between sources and reporters. For some types of news, there may be
many sources competing with each other; for other types of news, there
may be a single source with a monopoly on the relevant insider
information. Analogously, there may sometimes be a single reporter, and
at other times many reporters competing for the same source or sources.
We will here analyze one of the possible relationships between a source
(or sources) and a reporter (or reporters). We will study the relationship
between a single source (with a monopoly on the relevant insider
information) and a single reporter (with a monopoly on reporting this
specific information). A famous example of this type of relationship is
provided by the Deepthroat source in the Watergate scandal, and the
reporter Bob Woodward.
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A question of central interest in analyzing the bilateral monopoly
relationship between a single source and a single reporter is identifying
the conditions under which the source can control how the information
is reported after it has been revealed to the reporter. Consider the case
where, after obtaining the information from the source, the reporter can
choose between writing a story that is more truthful (taking action m) and
writing a story that is less truthful (taking action 1). An example of a
reporter’s "more truthful" action is one in which the reporter not only
writes up what the source says but, in addition, seeks "balance" or
"objectivity" by reporting related information.
The action chosen by the reporter does not completely determine the
payoffs from the newspaper article to either the source or the reporter.
There are several reasons for this. One reason is that the content of the
article may be affected by actions chosen by the editor in addition to the
reporter’s action. The editor may insist on modifying the reporter’s initial
draft in certain ways, e.g., by adding or interpolating material that
disputes or contradicts the source’s statements. Another route to the same
effect is to publish conflicting material either in another story on the same
page or on the editorial page. Such decisions are in the hands of the
editor, rather than the (initial) reporter. The payoffs also depend on what
statements have been publicly or privately made by other credible
principals during the same time period, which is outside the control of
either the reporter or the editor. The payoffs from the reporter’s article
may also depend on whether it appears on page one or on some other
page. Other things which may affect the impact of an article, and hence
the payoffs to the source and to the reporter, include day of the week and
season of the year in which it appears, whether or not Congress is in
session, and so on.
Since the reporter’s action does not completely determine the payoffs
to the source, an important consideration in determining the source’s
ability to influence the reporter’s choice of action is whether or not the
source can observe that choice. Subsequent analysis will be divided into
two parts which differ in terms of an assumption that the source either
can or cannot observe whether the reporter chose to write a more truthful
or a less truthful story. As we shall see, the source’s ability to influence
the reporter’s choice without observing it depends on the existence of a
regularity condition from the literature on statistical hypothesis testing.
An example that illustrates some of the preceding points is provided
by a 1965 story by Tom Wicker in the New York Times that was
published during the period in which the U.S. government was beginning
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to increase the level of troop commitment in Vietnam. Wicker’s story
contained the following:
President Johnson does not now intend either to halt the United States air
attacks on North Vietnam or to move American combat troops into the
forefront of a stepped-up antiguerrilla war in South Vietnam. . . .
Despite widespread speculation that many more American soldiers
would soon be shipped to Vietnam, high officials here insist that no
decision along those lines has been made. (Quoted from Hallin 1986, p.
96)
Obviously the second quoted paragraph undercuts the statement of the
official source (Robert McNamara), though it says nothing about the basis
of the "widespread speculation." Inclusion of the second paragraph
produced a story that was more truthful than a story that excluded this
paragraph. If the second paragraph was included because of a decision
made by the reporter, this would provide an example of a reporter’s
choosing to write a more truthful rather than a less truthful story.
Presumably, the source was not pleased by the inclusion of the second
paragraph. But could the source know whether the inclusion of this
paragraph resulted from the reporter’s choice or from a choice made by
the editor?
The effect on payoffs of the many things that neither the source nor
the reporter can control is represented by a random component in payoffs.
Thus the action chosen by the reporter does not determine certain payoffs;
instead, the reporter’s action determines probability distributions of
returns for the source and the reporter. Let u, be the utility payoff for the
source if state of the world i occurs, where i = 1, 2 ,. . . n. Similarly, let
Vj be the utility payoff for the reporter if state i occurs. A "state of the
world" is defined by a specification of all outcomes from reporting a
story that matter to the source and the reporter, including the reactions of
readers, voters, professional peers, employers, and so on.
Define p^ as the probabilities that the states occur if the reporter
chooses action m. The probabilities that the states occur if the reporter
chooses action 1 are denoted by pn. Assume that the state probabilities
have the usual properties of probabilities: pjm > 0, pu > 0, i = 1, 2, . . .
n, and

E
Pin>= E Pa=1i-1
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From the assumption that the reporter prefers more truthful reporting, one
has

(11)

E
i*l

Pirn Vi >

E
i-1

Pu Vi-

If action m is also preferred by the source, then there is no reason for the
source to attempt to control the reporter’s action. We will analyze the
case where the source prefers that the reporter choose action 1 and the
reporter prefers action m.
Assuming that the source prefers action 1 to action m means
n

( 12)

E

n

Pa

>

E

¡«i

Pa U¡.

If the source has no ability to reward or punish the reporter after giving
information to the reporter, then statement (11) implies that the reporter
will write a more truthful article (choose action m). We will consider the
situation where the source does have the ability to reward or punish the
reporter. There are two cases to consider, depending on whether the
source can or cannot observe the action chosen by the reporter.
Suppose that the source can observe the reporter’s choice of action and
has the ability to reward the reporter. In that case, the choice of action
by the source is transparent. The source can simply incur a utility cost
c to provide the reward y (c) to the reporter (where y (•) is a strictly
increasing function) such that

(13)

E
i-1

Pü v¡

+ y (c) =

E
p- v>i-l

Any reward slightly larger than y (c) will cause the reporter strictly to
prefer action 1 to action m. The source may not choose to reward the
reporter sufficiently to induce the reporter to take action 1, even given the
ability to do so. If
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p„, U:,

then the source would prefer the reporter’s more truthful report to the
combination of the reporter’s less truthful report and the cost of the
minimun reward needed to induce the reporter to choose action 1. Given
(12)-(14), the source’s decision would depend on the size of the payoff
from the best alternative to dealing with the reporter, as represented by
the source’s reservation utility, u. If

(15)

£
¡•1

pta Ui < u,

then the source would prefer to withhold the information from the
reporter. On the other hand, if

(16)

n
52
»■1

n
Pa ui - C > 52

P™ui

i»l

and
n

(17)

5T

Pa U; - C > U,

i-1

then the source would prefer to incur a cost of c, or slightly higher, in
order to induce the reporter to choose action 1.
The really interesting case to examine is the one where the source
cannot observe the reporter’s choice of action. Thus we here assume that
the source can read the article and judge whether its content is relatively
favorable or unfavorable, but that the source cannot observe whether the
article’s contents have resulted from decisions made by the reporter or by
the editor. We also here assume that the source cannot observe the
reporter’s influence over other things that affect the source’s utility
payoffs from the article, such as the page on which it appears and the
location and content of other related articles that could influence the
source’s payoffs. Thus we here assume that the source can only attempt
to infer the reporter’s choice of action from the payoffs that the source
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obtains from the article. If that is the case, then under what conditions
is it possible for the source to implement a reward plan (informal
contractual arrangement) that can influence the reporter’s choice of
action? We will next analyze this question.
Let C; be the source’s cost of rewarding the reporter in the amount
<J>(Cj) if state of the world i occurs. Assume that <t>(c¡) > 0 if c, > 0, and
that <{>(-) is strictly increasing and strictly concave; that is, assume that the
source can reward the reporter at a cost to the source, and that the source
can always increase the reward to the reporter by incurring more cost but
that there are diminishing returns to this reward/transfer activity. Also
assume that the source seeks to influence the reporter to choose action 1
with a set of rewards that minimize the source’s cost. Thus, the source
wants to identify cf, where i = 1, 2, . . . n, that solve the following
constrained maximization problem:

(18)

max
ci*".,cn

E

Pa (u¡ - c.)

subject to
E

Pa (Vi +

H

e

) )

> E

P in , ( V i -

4»

( C i) ) -

The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for maximization problem (18)
include

(19)

__ !__

= X* 1 -

P in

i=l,2,...,n,

<t>' (C-)

where <J>'(cf) is the first derivative of $(•) evaluated at the optimal cost
for state i, c f , and X* is the optimal value of a Lagrangian multiplier for
the constraint. The assumptions that the reporter prefers action m (see
statement (11)), and that <(>(•) is strictly increasing, imply that the
constraint will be binding and hence that X* > 0. The regularity
properties of <(>(•) and the conditions of statement (19) imply that c f
varies inversely with pim/Pii- Thus, if we consider two states, i = s and i
= k, then statement (19), strict positive monotonicity and strict concavity
of <(>(•), and <J)(Cj) > 0 for C; > 0 give us the following result:
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Statement (20) gives us the key insight needed to understand the
conditions under which the source can implement an implicit contract that
will induce the reporter to choose action 1 even though the source cannot
observe the chosen action, as we will now explain.
An expression of the form pim/pn is known in the statistics literature as
a likelihood ratio. It gives us the ratio of the likelihood of observing
(outcomes from) state i given that the reporter chose action m, to the
likelihood of observing (outcomes from) state i given that the reporter
chose action 1. If state i occurs, then a high value of pim/Pi, is evidence
that favors the inference that the reporter chose action m. Similarly, if
state i occurs, then a low value of pira/pn provides support for the
inference that the reporter chose action 1.
The appearance of the likelihood ratio in the necessary conditions of
statement (19) suggests that the source’s ability to implement a system of
rewards that will induce the reporter to choose the action favored by the
source is formally related to problems of statistical inference. A common
regularity condition that is used for such inference is known as the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).2 In the present context, the
MLRP implies that p;/pim is a monotone-increasing function of u,. This
means that the higher the utility payoff to the source, the more likely it
is that the reporter chose the action that is favorable to the source. If the
MLRP is satisfied, then the source’s contracting problem is relatively
simple. In order to induce the reporter to choose action 1, all the source
needs to do is to make a credible promise to the reporter of a sufficiently
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generous plan to share the payoffs in a monotone-increasing way by
adopting a rule such as this: if uk > us, then c* > c5 and (KcJ > <Kc,).
The MLRP makes it possible for the source to offer the reporter an
implicit contract that will induce the reporter to choose to write a less
truthful story. Whether or not the source would choose to offer the
reporter such a contract depends on how high the reporter’s "price" (the
c*) is, the source’s relative evaluations of the reporter’s actions (m and
1), and the source’s utility from the best alternative to dealing with the
reporter. Thus, analogously to statements (16) and (17), we now have the
necessary conditions,

(21)

¿

pa (u¡ - c*) > ¿

i=l

u(

i*l

and

(22)

¿ pa (Uj - c T) > Ü .
¡«1

Condition (21) means that the source would be willing to incur an
expected cost of

E Pi* c i ’
or slightly higher, in order to induce the reporter to choose action 1 rather
than action m. Condition (22) means that the source would prefer to
incur this expected cost rather than withhold information from the
reporter and receive the utility payoff, Q, from the best alternative to
dealing with the reporter.
We have identified conditions under which it would be possible for a
single source to induce a single reporter to choose to write a less truthful
rather than a more truthful story. To the extent that these conditions are
in fact satisfied, the existence of a bilateral monopoly (i.e., single source,
single reporter) relationship in journalism will foster inaccuracy.
Competition among multiple sources and/or multiple reporters would
check this cause of inaccuracy. Thus the existence of multiple sources,
with intersecting sets of insider information, would allow even a single
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reporter to "play off' each source against others as the sources competed
to put their preferred "spins" on the reported news. Furthermore, the
existence of multiple reporters would make it difficult or impossible for
even a single source to induce reporters to choose less truthful over more
truthful reporting. The reason for this is that the reward (or punishment)
actions that are available to a source operating within a free-press
political environment are essentially limited to granting (or not granting)
future access to insider information. Such a reward (or punishment)
action only has significant value (or cost) to a reporter if the access (or
lack of access) to the insider information is exclusive.
DIM ENSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE ANALYSIS
Obviously, a more comprehensive analysis of journalism in the spirit
of this chapter must take many additional factors or variables into
account. We briefly identify some of these factors in this final section.
The preceding section focused on news reports based on "insider"
statements. Most news, however, is generated through channels that are
open to other reporters, such as official proceedings (trials, election
tabulations, and the like), press releases, press conferences, background
briefings, and news reports from other news organizations (see Sigal
1973, ch. 6). Such news is available to all reporters, so every reporter (or
newspaper) is in competition with the rest of the media in its handling of
the story. No reporter can accommodate the source without considering
how his or her own story may look to the public or the professionals
when compared with competing stories on the same subject.
When multiple sources of information about an event exist, a reporter
has two tasks or decisions to make. First, the reporter must discover such
sources and what they have said, or actively invite them to comment on
the topic in question. Second, in deciding what competing sources to
quote in a story, a reporter must decide which of these sources are
sufficiently credible to be included. Sources that are wholly noncrediblc
to the readership will presumably be excluded, since their inclusion could
impugn the newspaper’s reputation. For example, in their handling of the
Gulf of Tonkin incident, which precipitated American escalation in
Vietnam, the American media simply reported the statements of President
Johnson, who spoke of "renewed hostile actions against U.S. ships on the
high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin" (quoted in Hallin 1986, p. 19). In fact,
there was serious doubt among those involved in the (second) Gulf of
Tonkin incident whether any "battle" actually took place, as Johnson
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claimed. The sonarman on the U.S. ship the Maddox had limited
experience; and although he thought he detected torpedo after torpedo
fired at the ship, many of the crew thought afterwards that he was
probably picking up the sound of the ship’s own propellers. The Maddox
had great difficulty finding any targets on its fire control radar. Several
hours after the engagement the commander of the task force cabled to
Pacific headquarters:
Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear
doubtful. . . . Freak weather effects and overeager sonarman may have
accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest
complete evaluation before any further action. (Quoted in Hallin 1986, p. 17)
Although the media did not have access to this report at the time, they
did have access to the denials by the North Vietnamese that the alleged
firing on the Maddox (in the relevant, "second" incident) actually took
place. These denials were reported in Le Monde, for example, but the
American press obviously regarded the North Vietnamese as noncredible
sources. Or at any rate they were unwilling to run the risk of appearing
to give any credibility to the North Vietnamese, presumably because of
the expected reaction either of the U.S. government or the U.S. public.
The use of multiple sources can help correct distorting or misleading
statements by single sources. But accuracy depends, in the end, on the
accuracy or reliability of the sources selected. As many researchers
indicate (e.g., Entman 1989), reporters typically depend for national news
on easily accessible, familiar elites: top officials in the White House and
executive branch agencies, members of Congress and powerful
congressional staffers, representatives of important interest groups, and
some party spokespersons, think-tank experts, former government
officials, elder statesmen and stateswomen still involved in politics.
Unfortunately, most of these elites are tainted; what they say is heavily
influenced by policies they want enacted or privileges they want
maintained. Instead of relying on rival elites, reporters can "mediate" a
given source’s claims by interpolating their own statements, explanations,
or interpretations. The problem with this approach is that the ethos of
journalism requires "balance" and "objectivity," which means that
reporters must not themselves appear to be partisan or biased for or
against a given source (e.g., a government official). Departures from the
accepted journalistic ethos can result in sanctions from one’s professional
peers (a loss in reputation), sanctions from the public, and/or sanctions
from one’s boss (the editor or media owner). Nonetheless, explanations
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and interpretations of a source’s statements can go a long way toward
helping the audience reach an accurate assessment of the truth of a
source’s statements.
A vivid example was some television coverage of Richard Nixon’s
March 1974 appearance before the National Association of Broadcasters,
while he was beset by the Watergate investigations. Immediately
following the news conference, CBS broadcast live roughly three and a
half minutes of instant analysis by correspondents Roger Mudd and Bruce
Morton, which focused exclusively on Watergate (though this subject
occupied only six of the eighteen questions posed during the news
conference) and analyzed the president’s appearance in strategic terms.
Mudd explained Nixon’s purpose as "to be seen as many places before
as favorable an audience as he can arrange" and "to clothe the presidency
with as much higher responsibility as he can bring to it." A subsequent
experimental study of students’ reactions showed that those exposed to
the instant analysis were greatly influenced by it (see Paletz and Entman
1981, pp. 66-67). Can network correspondents always be so assertive,
however? How often can they engage in factual contradiction, judgment,
and speculation about a president’s remarks? As Paletz and Entman
(1981, pp. 69 ff.) emphasize, this is only "economically" feasible (our
expression) under special circumstances. When presidential status is high,
for example, it may not be feasible. Only during the waning or
weakened period of a presidency can correspondents risk the cost of
criticisms or sanctions from various quarters for such "bold"
interpretations or statements of their own.
This raises questions about the effectiveness of the ethos of "balance"
or "objectivity" in helping to secure truth. Ironically, it may be that the
very ethos of objectivity is subversive of its own goal: greater
truthfulness.
The ethos of objectivity may constrain and deter
correspondents from engaging in precisely the kind of analysis and
interpretation that audiences need in order to get at relevant truths.
Perhaps a change in ethos that allowed a more muck-raking or adversarial
posture toward official sources (or any sources) would actually encourage
greater truthfulness (at least more true belief on the part of the audience)
than the precepts of reportorial balance and objectivity.
This kind of possibility emerges in a different form in a discussion by
Paletz and Entman of the presentational style of network correspondents
and anchorpersons. Paletz and Entman (1981, p. 24) point out that
correspondents are authoritative and factual, their demeanor unemotional,
uninvolved, dispassionate. They do not reveal strong opinions about the
events they cover and are hardly ever emotional on camera. This style
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comports with the ethos of objectivity, and it enhances the credibility of
the information and opinions which compose the news. But, observe
Paletz and Entman, this presentational product disguises the process of
selecting, framing, reconstituting, and reconstructing reality that is
actually taking place.
The appearance of knowledgeability and
impartiality, it may be argued, contributes to credulity as opposed to
skepticism on the part of the audience. And ultimately, such credulity
may hinder the formation of true belief on the part of that audience.
Two other topics for the economic analysis of the news may be
mentioned briefly in conclusion. First, an economic approach should
come to terms with earlier models of the news with an economic tenor.
Two such models are called by Cohen and Young (1981, p. 13) the "mass
manipulative model" and the "market or commercial model." In the
manipulative model, those in power use the media to mystify and
manipulate the public. The market model argues that there is variety and
diversity in information and opinions presented in the mass media and
that such variation minimizes the chances of manipulation.
Our
discussion does not mean to come down squarely on either side of this
dispute, but the elements of truth in each contender should be assessed.
Second, there is an element in the market model that is widely
endorsed, and we should give it at least passing attention before
concluding. This element concerns the nature of the public "demand" for
truth. Although we have defended the proposition that truth acquisition
is a "major" goal of readers, we certainly concede that truth is not their
exclusive interest. One way of putting the point is to say that the public
wants some but not all kinds of truths. Readers are more interested in
dramatic and simple truths, not abstract, dry, or complex truths. A
slightly different way of putting the point is not in terms of the truths
themselves, but the modes o f presentation of truths. Audiences for news
are said to prefer the dramatic to the drab, the personalized to the
impersonalized, the simple to the complex, the unambiguous to the
ambiguous, and so forth. This demand shapes what newsmakers consider
newsworthy, and hence what ultimately appears on television or is given
prominent coverage in the print media. The question is how much this
distorts the body of information (or misinformation) available to the
citizenry. It is easy to say, of course, that the result is very poor
"quality" of information. But it would be good to have a more precise
analysis of how audience preferences for certain modes of presentation,
and putative dispositions to minimize cognitive effort in assimilating
news, result in actual falsity or inaccuracy of belief.3
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Notes
1. The model developed in this section adapts a type of analysis originated
by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1974).
2. The key role of the MLRP in some models of information asymmetry was
prevoiusly demonstrated by Milgrom (1981).3
3. Helpful comments and suggestions were provided by participants in the
Social Science and Philosophy Workshop at the University of Arizona. Cox’s
work on this chapter was partially supported by the National Science Foundation
(grant number SES-9108888).

